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The interaction between the de-nationalizing of key economic institutions 
and spaces, on the one hand, and the re-nationalizing of politics on the other 
provides one of the main contexts for immigration policy and practice today. 
We see a growing consensus in the community of states to lift border controls 
for the flow of capital, information, services, and more broadly, to further 
globalization. But when it comes to immigrants and refugees whether in North 
America, Western Europe or Japan, we see the national state claiming all its 
old splendor, and asserting its sovereign right to control its borders, a right 
that is a matter of consensus in the community of states.
What does it mean for the state to relinquish sovereignty in some realms 
and to continue to be sovereign in others? If we accept, as I do, that the state 
itself has been transformed by its participation in the implementation of laws 
and regulations necessary for economic globalization, we must accept as a 
possibility that sovereignty itself has been transformed. Elsewhere (1996) I 
have argued that exclusive territoriality -  a marking feature of the modern 
state -  is being destabilized by economic globalization and that we are seeing 
the elements of a process of denationalization of national territory, though in a 
highly specialized institutiional and functional way. Further, the particular 
combination of power and legitimacy we call sovereignty, which has over the 
last century become almost synonimous with the national state, is today being 
partly unbundled, redistributed onto other entities, particularly supranational 
organizations, international agreements on human rights, and the new emer­
gent private international legal regime for business transactions (See Sassen 
1996). With all of this happening what does it mean to assert, as is done over 
and over again in the immigration literature, that the state has exclusive au­
thority over the entry of non-nationals. Is the character of that exclusive au­
thority today the same it was before the current phase of globalization and the 
ascendance of human rights as a non-state centered form of legitimate power1?
My analysis focuses largely on immigration in the highly developed receiv­
ing countries. I use the notion of immigration policy rather broadly to refer to 
a wide range of distinct national policies. I should note that it is often difficult
1 Immigration can then be seen as a strategic research site for the examination of the relation
and the tension betwen the idea of sovereignty over borders and the constraints states




























































































to distinguish immigrants and refugees. But there is (still) a separate regime 
for refugees in all these countries. And there is an international regime for 
refugees, something that can hardly be said for immigration.
Beyond the first, brief introductory section, I will focus first on the con­
straints faced by the state in highly developed countries in the making of im­
migration policy today, and then on the constraints resulting from the state’s 
role in the implementation of global economic processes and institutions. In 
the final section I discuss the implications of these two types of constraints for 
immigration policy making and implementation.
The Border and the Individual as Regulatory Sites
In my reading there is a fundamental framework that roots all the country- 
specific immigration policies of the developed world in a common set of con­
ceptions about the role of the state and of national borders. The purpose here 
is not to minimize the many differences in national policies, but to underline 
the growing convergence in various aspects of immigration policy and prac­
tice2.
First, the sovereignty of the state and border control, whether land borders, 
airports, or consulates in sending countries, lie at the heart of the regulatory 
effort. Secondly, immigration policy is shaped by an understanding of immi­
gration as the consequence of the individual actions of emigrants; the receiving 
country is taken as a passive agent, one not implicated in the process of emi­
gration. In refugee policy, in contrast, there is a recognition of other factors, 
beyond the control of individuals, as leading to outflows3. Two fundmental
2 There is a vast and rich scholarly literature that documents and interprets the specificity and 
distinctiveness of immigration policy in highly developed countries (e.g. Weil 1991; 
Cornelius, Hollifield and Martin 1994; Weiner 1995; Soysal 1994; Thranhardt 1993; Bade 
1992, to mention just a few). As a body this literature allows us to see the many differences 
among these countries.
3 Refugee policy in some countries does lift the burden of immigration from the immigrant’s 
shoulders. US refugee policy, particularly for the case of Indochinese refugees, does 
acknowledge partial responsibility on the part of the government. Clearly, in the case of 





























































































traits of immigration policy are, then, that it singles out the border and the 
individual as the sites for regulatory enforcement.
The sovereignty of the state when it comes to power over entry is well es­
tablished by treaty law and constitutionally. The Convention of The Hague of 
1930 asserted the right of the state to grant citizenship; the 1952 Convention 
on Refugees which asserted that the right to leave is a universal right, re­
mained silent on the right to entry -  better silence than evident contradiction. 
(As is well known, the status of refugees and their right not to be forcibly re­
turned are established in international law, but there is no corresponding right 
of asylum; such right is at the discretion of a receiving state). There are vari­
ous human rights declarations and conventions that urge states to grant asylum 
on humanitarian grounds, but they all recognize the absolute discretion of 
states in this matter4. A few states, notably Austria and Germany, give those 
formally recognized as refugees a legal right to asylum -  though this is under 
revision. More recently, the various agreements towards the formation of the 
European Union, keep asserting the right of the state to control who can enter. 
This is quite a contrast with the assertions in the GATT, NAFTA, and the EU 
about the need to lift state controls over borders when it comes to the flow of 
capital, information, services, and state controls over the domestic financial 
markets.
Secondly, on the matter of the individual as a site for enforcement, two dif­
ferent operational logics are becoming evident. One of these logics -  the one 
embedded in immigration policy -  places exclusive responsibility for the im­
migration process on the individual, and hence makes of the individual the site 
for the excercise of the state’s authority. There is a strong tendency in immi­
gration policy in developed countries to reduce the process to the actions of 
individuals. The individual is the site for accountability and for enforcement. 
Yet it is now increasingly being recognized that international migrations are 
embedded in larger geopolitical and transnational economic dynamics. The 
worldwide evidence shows rather clearly that there is considerable patterning 
in the geography of migrations, and that the major receiving countries tend to 
get immigrants from their zones of influence. This holds for countries as 
diverse as the US, France or Japan. Immigration is at least partly an outcome 
of the actions of the governments and major private economic actors in receiv­
ing countries. Economic internationalization and the geopolitics resulting from
4 One important exception is The 1969 Convention on Refugee Problems in Africa adopted




























































































older colonial patterns suggest that the responsibility for immigration may not 
be exclusively the immigrant’s. Analytically these conditions only can enter 
into theorizations about the state and immigration when we suspend the 
proposition implicit in much immigration analysis, that immigration is the 
result of individual action. (Given the wider familiarity with this subject, I 
have confined it to the Appendix in this paper). In the other logic, that 
embedded in human rights agreements, the individual emerges as a site for 
contesting the authority (sovereignty) of the state because s/he is the site for 
human rights. (For a detailed analysis of the interaction of these two logics see 
Sassen 1996).
The next section examines the constraints within which the state in the 
highly developed countries makes immigration policy.
Beyond Sovereignty:
Constraints on States’ Policy Making
When it comes to immigration policy, states under the rule of law increas­
ingly confront a range of rights and obligations, pressures from both inside 
and outside, from universal human rights to not so universal ethnic lobbies. 
The overall effect is to constrain the sovereignty of the state and to undermine 
old notions about immigration control.
First, we see emerging a de facto regime, centered in international agreements 
and conventions as well as in various rights gained by immigrants, that limits 
the state’s role in controlling immigration. An example of such an agreement 
is the International Convention adopted by the General Assembly of the UN on 
Dec. 18 1990 on the protection of the rights of all migrant workers and mem­
bers of their families (Resolution 45/158). (See, e.g. Hollifield, 1992; Baubock 
1994; Sassen 1996, Part Three). Further, there is a set of rights of resident 
immigrants widely upheld by legal authorities. We have also seen the gradual 
expansion over the last three decades of civil and social rights to marginal 
populations, whether women, ethnic minorities, or immigrants and refugees.
The extension of rights, which has taken place mostly through the judiciary 
has confronted states with a number of constraints in the area of immigration 




























































































France and Germany to limit family reunification which were blocked by 
administrative and constitutional courts on the grounds that such restrictions 
would violate international agreements. The courts have also regularly sup­
ported a combination of rights of resident immigrants which have the effect of 
limiting the government’s power over resident immigrants. Similarly such 
courts have limited the ability of governments to restrict or stop asylum seek­
ers from entering the country5.
Finally, the numbers and kinds of political actors involved in immigration 
policy debates and policy making in Western Europe, North America, and 
Japan are far greater than they were two decades ago: the European Union, 
anti-immigrant parties, vast networks of organizations in both Europe and 
North America that often represent immigrants, or claim to do so, and fight 
for immigrant rights, immigrant associations and immigrant politicians, 
mostly in the second generation, and, especially in the US so-called ethnic 
lobbies6. The policy process for immigration is no longer confined to a nar­
row governmental arena of ministerial and administrative interaction. Public 
opinion and public political debate have become part of the arena wherein 
immigration policy is shaped7. Whole parties position themselves politically in
5 These efforts that mix the conventions on universal human rights and national judiciaries 
assume many different forms. Some of the instances in the US are the sanctuary movement 
in the 1980s which sought to establish protected areas, typically in churches, for refugees 
from Central America; judicial battles, such as those around the status of Salvadoreans 
granted indefinite stays though formally defined as illegal; the fight for the rights of detained 
Haitians in an earlier wave of boat lifts. It is clear that notwithstanding the lack of an 
enforcement apparatus, human rights limit the discretion of states in how they treat non­
nationals on their territory. It is also worth noting in this regard that UNHCR is the only 
UN agency with a universally conceded right of access to a country.
6 While these developments are well known for the cases of Europe and North America, there 
is not much general awareness of the fact that we are seeing incipient forms in Japan as well 
(See, e.g. Shank 1995). For instance in Japan today we see a strong group of human rights 
advocates for immigrants; efforts by non-official unions to organize undocumented 
immigrant workers; organizations working on behalf of immigrants which receive funding 
from individuals or government institutions in sending countries (e.g. the Thai Ambassador 
to Japan announced in October 1995 that his government will give a total of 2.5 million 
baht, about 100,000 USS, to five civic groups that assist Thai migrant workers, especially 
undocumented ones; see Japan Times, October 18 1995).
7 Further, the growth of immigration, refugee flows, ethnicity and regionalism, raise 
questions about the accepted notion of citizenship in contemporary nation-states and hence 
about the formal structures for accountability. My research on the international circulation of 
capital and labor has raised questions for me on the meaning of such concepts as national 
economy and national workforce under conditions of growing internationalization of capital 
and the growing presence of immigrant workers in major industrial countries. Furthermore, 




























































































terms of their stand on immigration, especially in some of the European 
countries.
These developments are particularly evident in the case of the European 
Union8. Europe’s single market program has had a powerful impact in raising 
the prominence of various issues associated with free circulation of people as 
an essential element in creating a frontier-free community; the EC institutions 
lacked the legal competence to deal with many of these issues but had to begin 
to address them. Gradually EC institutions have wound up more deeply in­
volved with visa policy, family reunification and migration policy -  all for­
merly exclusively in the domain of the individual national states. National gov­
ernments resisted EC involvement in these once exclusively national domains. 
But now both legal and practical issues have made such involvement acceptable 
and inevitable notwithstanding many public pronouncements to the contrary.
It is becoming evident that many aspects of immigration and refugee policy 
intersect with EC legal competence. A key nexus here is the free movement of 
persons and attendant social rights as part of the formation of a single market. 
In practice the EC is assuming an increasingly important role and the fact that 
these are immigration countries is slowly being acknowledged. The monetary 
and economic union would require greater flexibility in movement of workers 
and their families and thereby pose increasing problems for national immigra­
tion laws regarding non-Ec nationals in EC member states.
There is now growing recognition for the need of an EC-wide immigration 
policy, something denied for a long time by individual states. This has become 
even more urgent with the collapse of the socialist bloc, and the rapid increase 
in refugees. Though very slowly the general direction has been towards a 
closer union of member states immigration policies.
In the case of the US, the combination of forces at the governmental level is 
quite different yet has similar general implications about the state’s constraints
about the content of the concept of nation-based citizenship. The portability of national 
identity raises questions about the bonds with other countries, or localities within them; and 
the resurgence of ethnic regionalism creates barriers to the political incorporation of new 
immigrants.(See, e.g. Soysal, 1995; Baubock, 1994; Sassen 1996a).
8 There is a large and rich literature on the development of immigration policy at the European 
level; please refer to footnote for a few citations. Longer bibliographies and analyses on the 
particular angle under discussion here -  limitations on the autonomy of the state in making 




























































































in immigration policy making. Immigration policy in the US is today largely 
debated and shaped by Congress, and hence is highly public and subject to a 
vast multiplicty of local interests, notably ethnic lobbies9. And we know well 
how very sensitive congressmen and women are to the demographics of their 
districts. This has made it a very public process, quite different from other 
processes of policy making10.
The fact that immigration in the US has historically been the preserve of the 
Federal government, particularly Congress, assumes new meaning in today’s 
context of radical devolution -  the return of powers to the states11. There is 
now an emerging conflict between several state governments and the Federal 
government around the particular issue of federal mandates concerning 
immigrants -  such as access to public health care and schools -  without 
mandatory federal funding. Thus states with disproportionate shares of immi­
grants are asserting that they are disproportionately burdened by the putative
9 Jusrisdiction over immigration matters in the US Congress lies with the Judiciary 
Committee, not with the Foreign Affairs Commitee as might have been the case. 
Congressional intent on immigration is often at odds with the foreign affairs priorities of the 
Executive. There is a certain policy making tug of war (Mitchell, 199 ). It has not always 
been this way. In the late 1940s and 1950s there was great concern with how immigration 
policy could be used to advance foreign policy objectives. The history of what government 
agency was responsible for immigration is rather interesting. Earlier, when the Department 
of Labor (DOL) was created in 1914 it got the responsibility for immigration policy. On 
June 1933, President Roosevelt combined functions into the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service within DOL. The advent of WWII brought a shift in the administrative 
responsibility for the country’s immigration policy: in 1940 President Roosevelt 
recommended it be shifted to the Department of Justice, because of the supposed political 
threat represented by immigrants from enemy countries. This was meant to last for the war 
and then INS was to be returned to the DOL. But it never was. It also meant that 
immigration wound up in Congress in committees traditionally reserved for lawyers, as are 
the Senate and House Judiciary Committees. It has been said that this is why immigration 
law is so complicated (and, I would add, so centered on the legalities of entry and so 
unconcerned with broader issues).
10 There are diverse social forces shaping the role of the state depending on the matter at hand. 
Thus in the early 1980s bank crisis, for instance, the players were few and well 
coordinated; the state basically relinquished the organizing capacity to the banks, the IMF, 
and a few other actors. All very discreet, indeed so discreet that if you look closely the 
government was hardly a player in that crisis. This is quite a contrast with the deliberations 
around the passing of the 1986 Immigration and Reform Control Act -  which was a sort of 
national brawl. In trade liberalization discussions there are often multiple players, and the 
executive may or may not relinquish powers to congress.
11 Aman Jr. (1995) has noted that although political and constitutional arguments for 
reallocating federal power to the states are not new, the recent re-emergence of the Tenth 
Amendment as a politically viable and popular guideline is a major political shift since the 




























































































costs of immigration. I should note, that in the US the costs of immigration are 
an area of great debate and wide ranging estimates12. At the heart of this 
conflict is the fact that the Federal Government sets policy but does not assume 
responsibility, financial or otherwise for the implementation of many key 
aspects of immigration policy. The conflict is illustrated by the notorious case 
of the state of California and its US$ 377 million lawsuit against the Federal 
government. The radical devolution under way now is going to accentuate 
some of these divisions further.
One of the questions raised by these developments concerns the nature of 
the control by the state in regulating immigration? The question here is not so 
much, how effective is a state’s control over its borders -  we know it is never 
absolute. The question concerns rather the substantive nature of state control 
over immigration given international human rights agreements, the extension 
of various social and political rights to resident immigrants over the last 
twenty years, the multiplication of political actors involved with the immigra­
tion question.
There is, first, the matter of the unintended consequences of policies, 
wheter immigration policies as such or other kinds of policies which have 
immigration impacts. For instance, the 1965 US Immigration Act had conse­
quences not intended or foreseen by its framers (Reimers, 1983; Briggs 1994); 
there was a generalized expectation it would bring in more of the nationalities 
already present in the country, i.e. Europeans, given its emphasis on family 
reunion. Other kinds of unintended consequences are related to the interna­
tionalization of production and foreign aid (Sassen 1988; Journal fur Entwick- 
lungspolitik 1995; Bonacich et al. 1995). These often turned out to have unex­
pected impacts on immigration. Similar unintended consequences have been 
associated with military aid and subsequent refugee flows, e.g. Salvador in the 
decade of the 1980s (Mahler 1995). Although immigration policy has rarely 
been an explicit, formal component of foreign policy apparatus in the US, the 
latter has had significant impacts on immigration besides the weel established 
fact of refugee flows from Indochina. If one were to be discreet, one would 
say that foreign aid has rarely deterred emigration13. It is also a fact that
12 The latest study by the Washington based Urban Institute found that immigrants contribute 
US$ 30 billion more in taxes than they take in services.
13 Take Salvador in the 1980s: billions of dollars in aid poured in, and hundreds of thousands 
of Salvadorans poured out as US aid raised the effectiveness of Salvador’s military control 
and aggression against its own people. Or the case of the Philippines, a country that 




























































































domestic US policies with a foreign, overseas impact have contributed to 
promote emigration to the US. There is the notorious sugar price support 
provision of the early 1980s: tax payers paid 3 billion annually to support the 
price of sugar for US producers. This kept Caribbean Basin countries out of 
the competition and resulted in a loss of 400,000 jobs there from 1982 to 
1988; for example, the Dominican Republic lost three quarters of its sugar 
export quota in less than a decade. The 1980s was also an era of large 
increases in immigration from that region.
A second type of condition that illuminates the issue of the substantive 
nature of the control by states over immigration is a twist on the zero sum 
argument. If a government closes one kind of entry category, recent history 
shows that another one will have a rise in numbers. A variant on this dynamic 
is that if a government has, for instance, a very liberal policy on asylum, pub­
lic opinion may turn against all asylum seekers and close up the country 
totally; this in turn is likely to promote an increase in irregular entries14.
There is a third set of conditions that can be seen as reducing the autonomy 
of the state in controlling immigration. Large scale international migrations 
are embedded in rather complex economic, social and ethnic networks. They 
are highly conditionned and structured flows. States may insist in treating 
immigration as the aggregate outcome of individual actions and as distinct and 
autonomous from other major geopolitical and transnational processes. But 
they cannot escape the consequences of those larger dynamics and of their 
insistence on isolating the immigration policy question.
These constraints on the state’s capacity to control immigration should not 
be seen as a control crisis. This type of analysis opens up the immigration 
policy question beyond the familiar range of the border and the individual as
by security issues. Emigration resulting from US economic and political interventions is 
evident in the Dominican emigration in the 1960s and in the emigration from India and 
Pakistan to the US -  the latter two associated as well with security aid from the US. (I have 
long argued as a scholar that policy makers should have migration impact statements 
attached to various policies.)
14 Increasingly, unilateral policy by a major immigration country is problematic. One of the 
dramatic examples was that of Germany which began to receive massive numbers of 
entrants as the other European states gradually tightened their policies and Germany kept its 
very liberal asylum policy. Another case is the importance for the EC today that the 





























































































the sites for regulatory enforcement. It signals that international migrations 
are partly embedded in conditions produced by economic internationalization 
both in sending and in receiving areas. While a national state may have the 
power to write the text of an immigration policy, it is likely to be dealing with 
a complex, deeply embedded and transnational process that it can only partly 
address or regulate through immigration policy as conventionally under­
stood15.
While the state continues to play the most important role in immigration 
policy making and implementation, the state itself has been transformed by the 
growth of a global economic system and other transnational processes. These 
have brought yet another set of conditions to bear on the state’s regulatory 
role. One particular aspect of this development is of significance to the role of 
the state in immigration policy making and implementation: The state in all the 
highly developed countries (and in many of the developing countries) has par­
ticipated in the implementation of a global economic system and in furthering 
a consensus around the pursuit of this objective. This participation has trans­
formed the state itself, affected the power of different agencies within it, and it 
has furthered the internationalization of the inter-state system. It is thus no 
longer sufficient simply to examine the role of the state in migration policy 
design and implementation; it is necessary to examine also the transformation 
of the state itself and what that can entail for migration policy and the regula­
tion of migration flows and settlement. For the purposes of immigration pol­
icy analyses it is becoming important to factor in these transformations of the 
state and the inter-state system precisely because the state is a major actor in 
immigration policy and regulation. This transformation of the state and the 
inter-state system is the subject of the next section.
15 On a somewhat related matter, it seems to me that the sense of an immigration control crisis 
that prevails today in many of the highly developed countries is in some ways unwarranted, 
even though states have less control than they would like because immigration is caught in a 
web of other dynamics. When we look at the characteristics of immigrations over time and 
across the world, it is clear that these are highly patterned flows, embedded in other 
dynamics which contain equilibrating mechanisms, that they have a duration (many 
immigrations have lasted for fifty years and then come to an end); that there is more return 
migration than we generally realize (e.g. soviet engineers and intellectuals who went back to 
Moscow from Israel; Mexicans who returned after becoming legal residents through the 
IRCA amnesty program, feeling that now they could circulate between the two countries); 
we also know from earlier historical periods when there were no controls, that most people 
did not leave poorer areas to go to richer ones, even though there were plenty of such 






























































































Economic Globalization and the Reconfigured State
A very different set of obligations limiting the autonomy of the state in 
policy making arises from the emerging consensus in the community of states 
to support free trade, dereguladon of the domestic financial markets, and open 
borders for the circulation of capital and information.
Globalization and deregulation have reduced the role of the state in the gov­
ernance of economic processes16. But the state remains as the ultimate guaran­
tor of the rights of capital whether national or foreign17. Firms operating 
transnationally want to ensure the functions traditionally exercised by the state 
in the national realm of the economy, notably guaranteeing property rights 
and contracts. The state here can be conceived of as representing a technical 
administrative capacity which cannot be replicated at this time by any other 
institutional arrangement (Sassen, 1996); furthermore, this is a capacity 
backed by military power. In pursuing this, state has been changed. The 
structure of the state itself in developed countries has undergone a shift away 
from those agencies most closely tied to domestic social forces as was the case
16 Globalization has contributed to a massive push towards deregulation across the board in 
many of the highly developed countries. Aman, Jr. (1995) notes that though not all 
industries in a nation are equally subject to intense global competition, the existence of such 
competition in general contributes to an overall political context that encourages domestic 
regulatory reform in all industries. “Political movements and regulatory trends do not tend 
to discriminate among industries once the momentum for certain reforms is underway” 
(Aman, Jr. 1995: 433). The impact of global competition on the domestic politics of 
regulation goes well beyond the industries in which this competition is most intense. For 
some recent formulations in what is a vast literature see Bonacich et al., 1994; Social Justice 
1993; Bose and Acosta-Belen 1995).
17 This guarantee of the rights of capital is embedded in a certain type of state, a certain 
conception of the rights of capital, and a certain type of international legal regime: largely 
the state of the most developed and most powerful countries in the world, western notions 
of contract and property rights, and a new legal regime aimed at furthering economic 
globalization. The hegemony of neo-liberal concepts of economic relations with its strong 
emphasis on markets, deregulation, free international trade has influenced policy in the 
1980s in USA and UK and now increasingly also in continental Europe. This has 
contributed to the formation of transnational legal regimes that are centered in Western 
economic concepts. Through the IMF and IBRD as well as Gatt this vision has spread to 
the developing world. An issue that is emerging as significant in view of the spread of 
western legal concepts is the critical examination of the philosophical premises about 




























































































in the US during the Pax Americana and towards those closest to the transna­
tional process of consensus formation18.
There has also been a displacement of public functions that were once in the 
domain of the government on to non- and quasi-governmental institutions19. 
The formation of the WTO represents such a displacement compared with 
earlier arrangements such as those of the Pax Americana. In the US, such a 
displacement is perhaps most sharply evident in the growing weight of its 
central bank in the setting of national economic policy. In its decisions the 
Federal Reserve, a body that prides itself for its independence from the gov­
ernment, is sharply influenced by the financial markets, which are increasingly 
international; and national economic policy in the US is increasingly being set 
by the Federal Reserve and the financial markets20.
18 According to some (see Panitch 1996; Mittelman 1996; Drache and Gertler 1991) the 
neoliberalism of the 1980s has redefined the role of states in national economies and in the 
inter-state system.
19 There are various sites for governance in the world economy beyond the nation-state. 
Among these are organizations involved with international economic issues, from the 
International Chamber of Commerce and the Court of Justice at The Hague, to the 
documents for, and authorized committees working on, the Single European Market and the 
free trade agreement between the US, Canada and Mexico. These are all de facto engaged in 
identifying, formalizing, and redesigning, components of transnational systems for 
economic governance.
20 The extent to which the international financial markets are dictating economic policy for rich 
and poor countries was well illustrated with the case of the Mexico financial crisis and the 
subsequent fear in Argentina and Brazil that they might “lose the confidence of the 
international financial markets.” The extent to which the US government is being shaped by 
the international financial markets in its economic decisions was illustrated by the priority 
given to a rescue package for the Mexican financial crisis and by the type of solution 
contained in this package, to wit, the restoration of the confidence of the international 
financial maricets in Mexico, specifically, in investment opportunities in Mexico. A financial 
response to this crisis was but one of several potential choices. For instance, conceivably 
there could have been an emphasis on promoting manufacturing growth and protecting 
small businesses and small homeowners from the bankruptcies now faced by many. And 
the US government could also conceivably have exhorted the Mexican government to give 
up on restoring confidence in the global financial markets and to focus on the production of 
real value added in the Mexican economy. Furthermore, this matter, which was basically 
presented as a global economic security issue, was handled not by the Secretary of State, 
but by the Secretary of the Treasury, someone who had been the so-called “Dean” of Wall 
Street There are two rather important novel elements here: that Treasury should handle this 
international crisis, and that the Secretary of that agency was a former top partner at 
Goldman Sachs Securities on Wall Street, one of the leading global financial firms. The 





























































































Another instantiation of this transformation concerns the impact of today’s 
global economy on the inter-state system. More generally, economic interna­
tionalization can, in principle, have different types of impacts or consequences 
for the inter-state system. During the Pax Americana, the effect was to 
strengthen the inter-state system. Leading economic sectors, especially manu­
facturing and raw materials extraction, were subject to international trade 
regimes that contributed to build the inter-state system. Individual states 
adjusted national economic policies to further this type of international eco­
nomic system, doubtless often pressured by the hegemonic power of the 
US.(Even though already then certain sectors did not fit comfortably under 
this largely trade dominated inter-state regime: out of their escape emerged 
the euro-markets and off-shore tax havens of the 1960s).
The evolution of international finance and the corporate services sector 
brings to the fore the extent to which the forms of economic globalization evi­
dent in the last two decades have not necessarily had the effect of strengthening 
the inter-state system21. The ascendance of international finance has produced 
regulatory voids that lie beyond not only states but also the inter-state sys­
tem22. Existing systems of governance and accountability for transnational 
economic activities and entities leave much ungovemed when it comes to these 
industries23.
21 There is an enormous literature on how the evolution of international finance over the 1980s 
reduced the regulatory control excercised by the state over this industry (For a discussion 
and review of this literature see Sassen, 1991: Part Two). This literature has to a large 
extent focused on the loss of regulatory power by single states. It has not addressed the 
question as to the impact on the inter-state system.
22 Because they are deeply embedded in telematics, advanced information industries also shed 
light on questions of control in the global economy that not only go beyond the state and the 
inter-state system but also beyond the notions of non-state centered systems of coordination 
prevalent in the literature on governance. These are questions of control that have to do with 
the orders of magnitude that can be achieved in the financial markets thanks to the speed in 
transactions made possible by the new technologies. The best example is probably the 
foreign currency markets which operate largely in electronic space and have achieved 
volumes that have left the central banks incapable of exercising the influence on exchange 
rates they are expected to have. These are questions of control that arise out of the 
properties of the new information technologies, notably the immense speed-up of 
transactions they make possible, rather than out of the extension of the economy beyond the 
state. (See Sassen 1996)
23 In this regard, an analysis of these industries sharpens the differences between the role of 
the state in earlier forms of internationalization and the current globalization of economic 




























































































The deregulation of key operations and markets in the financial industry can 
be seen as a negotiation between nation-based legal regimes and the formation 
of a consensus among a growing number of states about furthering the world 
economy (Mittelman, 1996; Trubek et al., 1993). In other words, it is not 
simply a matter of a space economy extending beyond a national realm24. It 
also has to do with the formation and legitimation of transnational legal 
regimes that are operating in national territories. National legal fields are 
becoming more internationalized in some of the major developed economies 
and transnational legal regimes are becoming more important and begin to 
penetrate national fields hitherto closed (e.g., Trubek et al.1993)25.
There are other instances of a displacement of what were once government 
functions for economic governance onto non- or quasi-govemmental entities. 
Among the most important ones in the private sector today are international 
commercial arbitration and the variety of institutions which fulfill rating and 
avisory functions that have become essential for the operation of the global 
economy. Over the past 20 years, international commercial arbitration has 
been transformed and institutionalized as the leading contractual method for 
the resolution of transnational commercial disputes. (Dezalay and Garth, 1995; 
Aksen, 1990). In a major study on international commercial arbitration 
(summarized in Dezalay and Garth 1995) Dezalay and Garth conclude that it is 
a delocalized and decentralized market for the administration of international 
commercial disputes, connected by more or less powerful institutions and 
individuals who are both competitive and complementary.
Another instance of a private regulatory system is represented by debt 
security or bond rating agencies which have come to play an increasingly im­
portant role in the global economy. In his study of credit rating processes, 
Sinclair (1994) found that these agencies function as mechanisms of
24 We are seeing the formation of an economic complex (finance and corporate services) with 
properties clearly distinguishing it from other economic complexes in that the articulation of 
its valorization dynamic with the public economic functions of the state is quite weak 
compared with Fordist manufacturing, for example. That is to say, it needs the state much 
less than Fordist manufacturing did.
25 Globalization restricts the range of regulatory options of national governments, as the 
Mexico crisis illustrates. Aman, Jr. (1995) shows how a global perspective on domestic 
regulatory politics helps explain the absence of radical differences in the regulatory 
outcomes of different US administrations over the last fifteen years. The pressures of global 
competition, the nature of corporate entities involved, and domestic political pressures to 
minimize costs and maximize flexibility militate in favor of new, more market-oriented 




























































































‘governance without government.’ He found that they have leverage because of 
their distinct gate-keeping functions with regard to investment funds sought by 
corporations and govemements. Sinclair (1994) posits that in this regard they 
can be seen as a significant force in the operation and expansion of the global 
economy. As with business law, the US agencies have expanded their influece 
overseas. (See generally Salacuse 1991; Aksen 1990). Sinclair (1994: 150) 
notes that ten years ago Moody’s and Standard and Poor had no analysts out­
side the US; by 1993 they each had about 100 in Europe, Japan and Australia.
Among the main points to extract from this examination are the changed 
articulation of the public functions of the state with major economic sectors 
and the displacement of what were once governmental functions on to non- or 
quasi-govemmental entities.
There are two distinct issues here. One is the formation of new legal 
regimes that negotiate between national sovereignty and the transnational 
practices of corporate economic actors. The second issue is the particular 
content of this new regime, one which contributes to strengthen the advantages 
of certain types of economic actors and to weaken those of others. That is to 
say, one could posit two distinct issues regarding governance: one centered on 
the effort to create viable systems of coordination/order among the powerful 
economic actors now operating globally, such as international commercial 
arbitration and credit rating agencies discussed in the previous section. A sec­
ond issue is not so much focused on how to create order at the top but on eq­
uity and distributive questions in the context of a globally integrated economic 
system with immense inequalities in the profit-making capacities of firms and 
in the earnings capacities of households. It is in this second context that the 
question of immigration is partly ensconced (Sassen 1996, Part three).
Implications for Immigration Policy
Does current immigration policy in advanced receiving economies need to 
factor-in these transformations if it is to be reasonably effective? There is 
some consensus about the fact of a growing gap between immigration policy 
intent and immigration reality in the major developed receiving countries (e.g. 
Cornelius, Hollifield and Martin 1995). One possibility is that the rather low 




























































































these transformations in the larger context for international migration and in 
the institutional apparatus for its regulation; migration policy continues to be 
characterized by its formal isolation from other major processes, as if it were 
possible to handle migration as a bounded, closed event.
Today we can see in all highly developed countries a combination of drives 
to create border-free economic spaces and drives for renewed border-control 
to keep immigrants and refugees out. The juxtaposition between these two dy­
namics provides one of the principal contexts in which today’s efforts to stop 
immigration assume their distinct meaning.
Current immigration policy in developed countries is increasingly at odds 
with other major policy frameworks in the international system and with the 
growth of global economic integration. There are one could say, two major 
epistemic communities—one concerning the flow of capital and information; 
the other, immigration. Both of these epistemic communities are international, 
and both enjoyg widespread consensus in the community of states.
The coexistence of such different regimes for capital and for immigrants 
has not been seen as an issue in the US The case of the EU is of interest here 
because it represents an advanced stage of formalization, and in this effort 
European states are discovering the difficulties if not impossibility of main- 
tainng two such diverse regimes. The European Community and the national 
governments of member states have found the juxtaposition of the divergent 
regimes for immigration flows and for other types of flows rather difficult to 
handle. The discussion, design and implementation of policy aimed at forming 
a European Union make it evident that immigration policy has to account the 
facts of rapid economic internationalization. The European Union shows us 
with great clarity the moment when states need to confront this contradiction 
in their design of formal policy frameworks. The other major regional sys­
tems in the world are far from that moment and may never reach it. Yet they 
contain less formalized versions of the juxtaposition between border-free 
economies and border controls to keep immigrants out. NAFTA is one such 
instance, as are, in a more diffuse way, various initiatives for greater eco­
nomic integration in the Western Hemisphere.
Though less clearly than in Western Europe, these issues are present in 
other regions with cross-border migrations. These are regional systems consti­
tuted partly as zones of influence of major economic or geo-political powers, 




























































































matters here is that to a good extent major international migration flows have 
been embedded in some or another variant of these regional systems. The 
quasi-transnational economic integration characterizing such regional systems 
produces its own variety of contradictions between drives for border-free 
economic spaces and border-control to keep immigrants and refugees out.
There are strategic sites where it becomes clear that the existence of two 
very different regimes for the circulation of capital and the circulation of 
immigrants poses problems that cannot be solved through the old rules of the 
game, where the facts of transnationalization weigh in on the state’s decisions 
regarding immigration. For instance, the need to create special regimes for the 
circulation of service workers both within GATT and NAFTA as part of the 
further internationalization of trade and investment in services (see Sassen, in 
progress). This regime for the circulation of service workers has been uncou­
pled from any notion of migration; but it represents in fact a version of tem­
porary labor migration. It is a regime for labor mobility which is in good part 
under the oversight of entitites that are quite autonomous from the govern­
ment26. This points to an institutional reshuffling of some of the components 
of sovereign power over entry and can be seen as an extension of the general 
set of processes whereby state sovereignty is partly being decentered onto 
other non- or quasi-govemmental entities for the governance of the global 
economy (Sassen 1996).
All of these developments have the effect of a) reducing the autonomy of 
the state in immigration policy making; and b) multiplying the sectors within 
the state that are addressing immigration policy and therewith multiplying the 
room for conflicts within the state. The assertion that the state is in charge of 
immigration policy is less and less helpful. Policy making regarding interna­
tional issues can engage very different parts of the government. The state itself 
has not only been transformed by its participation in the global economy, but 
has of course never been a homogeneous actor. It is constituted through mul­
tiple agencies and social forces. Indeed it could be said (cf. Mitchell 199 ) that
26 Another instantiation of the impact of globalization on governmental policy making can be 
seen in Japan’s new Immigration law passed in 1990 (actually an amendment on an earlier 
law on the entry and exit of aliens). This legislation opened the country to several categories 
of highly specialized professionals with a western background (e.g. experts in international 
finance, in western-style accounting, in western medicine, etc) in recognition of the 
growing internationalization of the professional world in Japan; it made the entry of what is 
referred to as “simple labor” illegal (Sassen 1993). This can be read as importing “western 




























































































although the state has central control over immigration policy, the work of ex- 
cercising that claimed power often begins with a limited contest between the 
state and interested social forces. These interest groups include agribusiness, 
manufacturing, humanitarian groups, unions, ethnic organizations, zero popu­
lation growth efforts. Today we need to add to this the fact that the hierarchies 
of power and influence within the state are being reconfigured by the further­
ing of economic globalization27.
The conditions within which immigration policy is being made and imple­
mented today range from the pressures of economic globalization and its im­
plications for the role of the state to international agreements on human rights. 
And the institutional setting within which immigration policy is being made 
and implemented ranges from national states and local states to supranational 
organizations.
Why does this transformation of the state and the inter-state system matter 
for immigration? The displacement of governance functions away from the 
state to non-state entities affects the state’s capacity to control or keep control­
ling its borders. New systems of governance are being created. Increasingly 
they may create conflicts with the state’s capacity to keep on regulating immi­
gration in the same ways. Further, the transformation of the state itself 
through its role in the implementation of global processes, may well contribute 
to new constraints, options and vested interests. The ascendance of agencies 
linked to furthering globalization and the decline of those linked to domestic 
equity questions is quite likely to eventually have an effect on the immigration 
agenda.
27 For instance, an item on internal changes in the state which may have impacts on 
immigration policy is the ascendance of so-called soft security issues. According to some 
observers, recent government reorganization in the departments of State, Defense, and the 





























































































Going Beyond the Individual:
Economic Internationalization and Geopolitical Linkages
Each country is unique and each migration flow is produced by specific 
conditions in time and place. But if we are to theorize the impact of economic 
internationalization we need to abstract from these particularities so as to ex­
amine more general tendencies in economic dominance and the formation of 
transnational spaces for economic activity. The purpose would be to capture 
the impact of the internationalization of economies on a) the formation of 
mechanisms binding emigration and immigration countries, and b) the organi­
zation of labor markets in both types of countries.
The assumption is that these developments in turn have an impact on the 
formation and directionality of migration flows. They produce conditions un­
der which poverty, unemployment or lack of opportunities for advancement 
can become activated as migration push factors, e.g. the development of com­
mercial agriculture and of export oriented standardized manufacturing have 
dislocated traditional economies and eliminated survival opportunities of small 
producers. And they contribute to the conditions under which immigrants can 
become incorporated in the labor markets of receiving countries, e.g. 
increased competitive pressures due to the internationalization of production 
have contributed to the weaken unions and generally to the search of low-wage 
workers in order to remain competitive with cheap third world imports.
The mechanisms binding immigration countries to emigration countries can, 
in principle assume many forms. But two appear to be dominant and account 
for most of the formation of flows. One is past colonial and current neo- or 
quasi-colonial bonds, including the types of military presence the US has taken 
in such diverse situations as El Salvador or Philippines. The other is the range 
of economic linkages brought about by economic internationalization, ranging 
from the off-shoring of production, the implantation of export-oriented agri­
culture through foreign investment, to the weight of multinationals in the con­
sumer markets of sending countries. There is a third type of linkage, charac­
terized by far higher degrees of specificity and including a variety of mecha­
nisms: the organized recruitment of workers, either directly by the govern­




























































































through kinship and family networks. Ethnic linkages established between 
communities of origin and destination, typically via the formation of transna­
tional households or broader kinship structures, emerge as crucial once a flow 
has been formed and serve to ensure its reproduction over time. These 
recruitment and ethnic linkages tend to operate within the broader transna­
tional spaces constituted via neo-colonial processes and/or economic interna­
tionalization.
Some form of organized recruitment by employers or governments on 
behalf of employers often lies at the origin of immigration flows, both in the 
1800s and today. But eventually most migration flows gain a certain autonomy 
from the organized recruitment mechanisms. While organized recruitment, 
and therewith the constitution of certain countries as labor-exporting coun­
tries, is in many ways radically different from the migrations engendered by 
erstwhile colonial bonds, there are also similarities28.
The large mass migrations of the 1800s emerged as part of the formation of 
a trans-Atlantic economic system binding several nation-states through eco­
nomic transactions and wars. The trans-Atlantic economy was at the core of 
US development. There were massive flows of capital, goods and workers and 
specific structures that produced this trans-Atlantic system. Before this period, 
labor movements across the Atlantic had been largely forced, notably slavery, 
and mostly from colonized African and Asian territories. Similarly, the 
migrations to England in the 1950s originated in what had once been British 
territories. Finally, the migrations into Western Europe of the 1960s and 
1970s occurred in a context of direct recruitment and of European regional 
dominance over the mediterranean and over some of the Eastern European 
countries. There are, I would say, few if any innocent bystanders among 
countries receiving large labor migrations. Receiving countries have typically 
been participants in the processes leading to the formation of international 
migration.
28 In many ways the labor-exporting country is put in a subordinate position, and keeps being 
represented in the media and in political discourse as a labor-exporting country. This was 
also the case last century when some labor-sending areas existed in conditions of economic 
subordination and often also quasipolitical subordination. The former Polish territories 
partioned off to Germany were such a region, a region which generated significant 
migration of “ethnic” Poles to Western Germany and beyond. It is the case of the Irish in 





























































































The renewal of mass immigration into the US in the 1960s, after five 
decades of little or no immigration, took place in a context of expanded US 
economic and military activity in Asia and the Caribbean Basin. The United 
States is at the heart of an international system of investment and production 
that binds these various regions. In the 1960s and 1970s, the United States 
played a crucial role in the development of a world economic system. It passed 
legislation aimed at opening its own and other countries’ economies to the flow 
of capital, goods, services and information. This central military, political and 
economic role contributed, I argue, both to the creation of conditions that 
mobilized people into migrations, whether local or international, and to the 
formation of links with the United States that subsequently were to serve as 
often unintended bridges for international migration. Measures commonly 
thought to deter emigration -  foreign investment and the promotion of export- 
oriented growth in developing countries -  seem to have had precisely the op­
posite effect. Among the leading senders of immigrants to the United States in 
the 1970s and 1980s have been several of the newly industrialized countries of 
South and Southeast Asia whose extremely high growth rates are generally 
recognized to be a result initially of foreign direct investment in export manu­
facturing.
That migrations are patterned is further reflected in the figures on the US 
share of global immigration. Though inadequate, the available evidence com­
piled by the United Nations Demographic Yearbook and World Population 
Prospects shows that in the mid-1980s the United States received about 19 per­
cent of global emigration. This figure is derived from data on permanent set­
tlement, which excludes illegal immigration and unofficial refugee flows 
between countries, a growing category. A breakdown by region and country 
of origin points to a distinct patterning. The US received 27 percent of total 
Asian emigration, but 81.5 percent of all Korean emigration and almost 100 
percent of emigration from the Philippines. It received 70 percent of 
Caribbean emigration, but almost 100 percent of emigration from the Domini­
can Republic and Jamaica and 62 percent from Haiti. And it received 19.5 per­
cent of all emigration from Central America, but 52 percent of emigration 
from El Salvador, the country with the greatest US involvement in the region.
On a more conceptual level one could generalize these tendencies and posit 
that immigration flows take place within systems and that these systems can be 
specified in a variety of ways. The type of economic specification contained in 
this particular paper represents but one of several possibilities. However, in 




























































































in political or ethnic terms. One could ask, for example, if there are systemic 
linkages underlying the current Central European migrations to Germany and 
Austria. Rather than simply posit the push factor of poverty, unemployment 
and the general failure of socialism, we might inquire as to the existence of 
linkages which operate as bridges. Thus, before WWII both Berlin and Vienna 
were major receivers of large migrations from a vast Eastern region. Fur­
thermore, these practices produced and reproduced migration systems as such. 
Finally, the aggressive campaign during the cold war years showing the West 
as a place where economic well being is the norm and well-paying jobs are 
easy to get, must also have had some effect in inducing people to migrate 
westward; a more accurate portrayal of conditions in the West might have 
deterred potential migrants beyond the absolutely convinced ones who can be 
seen as constituting a pent-up demand -  in other words, beyond those that 
would have come at all costs. These historical and current conditions contain 
elements for specifying the systems within which the current Eastern migra­
tion to Germany and Austria take place.
The fact that there is a geopolitics of migration is suggested by some of the 
immigration patterns in Europe. Sixty percent of the foreign residents in the 
United Kingdom are from Asian or African countries which were former 
dominions or colonies; European immigration is rather low, and almost three- 
fourth of these come from Ireland -  also once a colony. There are almost no 
immigrants from such countries as Turkey or Yugoslavia which provide the 
largest share to Germany, for instance. On the other side of the coin, almost 
all immigrants from the Indian subcontinent and from the English Caribbean 
residing in Europe are in the United Kingdom.
Continuing along these lines, in the first ten years after WWII, the vast 
majority of “immigrants” to Germany were the 8 million displaced ethnic 
Germans that resettled there. Another major group were the 3 million who 
came from the GDR before the Berlin Wall was erected in 1961. Almost all 
ethnic Germans went to Germany; and those that did not go to Germany went 
overseas. But also 86% of Greek immigrants in Europe reside in Germany, 
almost 80% of Turkish immigrants in Europe and 76% of Yugoslavs. Almost 
all Algerians residing in Europe are in France; and so are 86% of Tunisians 
and 61% of Moroccans. Almost all immigrants in Europe from overseas 
territories still under French control -  such as the French Antilles, Tahiti, 
French Guyana -  reside in France. But so do 84% of Portuguese and of 




























































































of recruiting/receiving migrant workers from these countries for its vineyards 
going back to the 1800s.
The Netherlands and Belgium both received significant numbers of people 
from their former colonial empires. They also received foreign workers from 
labor exporting countries, such as Italy, Morocco and Turkey. Switzerland 
similarly receives workers from traditional labor exporting countries: Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia and Turkey. All three countries originally orga­
nized the recruitment of these workers, until eventually a somewhat au­
tonomous set of flows was in place. Sweden receives 93% of Finnish immi­
grants. Also in Sweden as in the other countries, there is a large expansion of 
the recruitment area to include workers from the traditional labor exporting 
countries on the Mediterranean.
As a given labor migration flow ages, it tends to become more diversified 
in terms of destination. It suggests that a certain autonomy from older colonial 
and neo-colonial bonds sets in. Immigrants from Italy and Spain are now dis­
tributed among several countries. Among Italian immigrants in Europe, one- 
third reside in Germany, 27% in France, 24% in Switzerland, and 15% in 
Belgium. The fact that it is still a limited diversity of destinations could be 
seen as signaling the presence of migration systems. On the other hand, more 
recent labor migrations reveal very high levels of geographic concentration. 
The largest single immigrant group in any of Europe’s labor receiving coun­
tries today are the Turks, with 1.5 million in Germany.
It does seem, and the history of economic development supports this, that 
once an area becomes a significant emigration region it does not easily catch 
up in terms of development with those areas that emerge as labor importing 
areas, precisely because these have high growth, or at least relatively high 
growth, it seems that there is an accumulation of advantage. History suggests 
that this is an advantage which labor sending areas either a) cannot catch up 
with, andJor b) are structurally not going to be part of because the spatializa- 
tion of growth is precisely characterized by this type of uneven development. 
One cannot be too rigid and mechanical about these generalizations. But it is 
clear that Italy and Ireland, even if now they receive immigrants, have for two 
centuries been labor exporters and this has not necessarily been a macro-eco­
nomic advantage, even though individuals and localities may have benefitted.
The case of Japan is of interest here because it allows us to capture the 




























































































and to do so in a country with a radically different history, culture and, to a 
lesser extent, economic organization from those of other advanced economies 
(For a more detailed account see Sassen 1993; Shank 1995). One of the areas 
where this difference is evident is in Japan’s lack of an immigration history. 
Yet, though much later than most advanced economies, Japan now has a 
growing unauthorized immigrant workforce in low-wage, unskilled jobs in a 
context where Japanese youth are rejecting such jobs.
Why has this happened now rather than during the period of extremely 
rapid economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s when Japan experienced very 
sharp labor shortages? Japan is a major presence in a regional Asian economic 
system where it is the leading investor, foreign aid donor, and exporter of 
consumer goods (including cultural products). And while Japan is not quite as 
open to foreign firms as the US, there is a growing presence of such firms. Is 
the new immigration to Japan unrelated to these processes of internationaliza­
tion? Elsewhere (1993) I have argued that the new immigration is part of the 
globalization of Japan’s economy. This is easy to recognize in the case of for­
eign high-level manpower for the financial industry in Tokyo. It is less clearly 
so in the case of the new, mostly unauthorized immigration of manual workers 
employed in construction, manufacturing and low-wage jobs in services. In 
this latter case internationalization a) provides a context within which bridges 
are built with the countries of origin of potential emigrants and b) contributes 
to make the Japanese economy more porous, particularly so in the case of 
large cities.
Yet the policy framework for immigration treats the flow of labor as the 
result of individual actions, particularly the individual’s decision to migrate in 
search of better opportunities. Such a policy puts responsibility for immigra­
tion on the shoulders of immigrants. Policy commentary which speaks of an 
immigrant “influx” or “invasion” treats the receiving country as a passive 
agent; the causes for immigration appear to be fundamentally unconnected to 
past or current actions of receiving countries; immigration policy becomes a 
decision to be more or less benevolent in admitting immigrants. Absent from 
this understanding is the notion that the international activities of the govern­
ments or firms of receiving countries may have contributed to the formation 
of economic linkages with emigration countries, linkages that may function as 
bridges not only for capital but also for migration flows.
We are seeing the formation of similar migration processes in all major ad­




























































































could identify analytically as the intersection of processes of economic inter­
nationalization and labor market developments. Placing the formation of im­
migration flows and their continuation at this juncture allows us to see impor­
tant parallels in advanced economies with significant differences in terms of 
history and culture. The parallels result from the condition of being global 
powers with strong economic presences in transnational zones of influence and 
from major processes of economic restructuring evident in all advanced 
economies in the 1980s. The differences stem in part from the specifics of 
each country’s culture and history. In Japan we see the beginnings of processes 
which are longer-standing in the US and in Western Europe29.
29 This paper is based on a book being prepared for the Twenties Century Fund. I thank the 
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